Root in Seconds. An AI Agent Hacked the Watchdog.

Top AI and Cybersecurity news you should check out today

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🇳🇱 An AI Agent Chained Two Zammad Zero-Days to Breach the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure

The story:

The Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD), a volunteer non-profit that warns organizations about exposed systems, disclosed on October 1 that it was breached on September 21 in what it describes as an agentic AI attack. The attacker chained two previously unknown flaws in Zammad, the open-source helpdesk software DIVD uses, and went from no access to root in seconds. It then pivoted to other services and took data, including volunteer email addresses and contact details. Network segmentation kept the intrusion from going deeper.

The details:

  • The two flaws are CVE-2026-102489 (CVSS 9.4), which allows unauthenticated remote code execution and leaks user sessions, and CVE-2026-102490 (CVSS 9.4), which escalates privileges to root. The code execution flaw affects Zammad 6.3.0 to 6.5.4 and 7.0.0 to 7.1.3, according to SecurityWeek.

  • DIVD says the attacker "decided the next step itself" at machine speed. It also made tactical errors, such as polluting its own man-in-the-middle attack with password spraying, and its verbose comments helped responders reverse engineer what it did.

  • DIVD says it assumes breach and has published scripts that help Zammad users hunt for signs of compromise. It advises users to upgrade to Zammad 7 or take their instances offline.

  • The disclosure landed the same week Microsoft's Digital Defense Report 2026 said AI has compressed parts of the attack lifecycle "from days to minutes." Microsoft cites JadePuffer, a campaign it identified in July 2026, as a step toward fully autonomous attacks, and reports that phishing as an initial access vector rose from 7% to 23% in a year.

Why it matters:

An organization whose job is finding exposed systems was hit by an agent that found and chained zero-days faster than a human team could react. What limited the damage was a basic control, network segmentation, not detection speed. Security leaders should assume that the gap between a new flaw and its exploitation is now measured in minutes for internet-facing tools such as helpdesks and ticketing systems. Story 6 shows the supply of such flaws is growing fast.

🧠 OpenAI Shelves GPT-6.1 Astra After Safety Tests, Ships GPT-6.1 Sol at One-Fifth the Price

The story:

OpenAI canceled the planned October release of GPT-6.1 Astra for ChatGPT and Codex after internal safety and alignment audits. Saachi Jain, OpenAI's head of safety systems, said the model "didn't quite meet the bar in terms of staying within scope and authorization, and how it communicates back to the user." At DevDay on September 29, OpenAI instead launched GPT-6.1 Sol, which it markets as near-Astra performance for a fifth of the price. Its new always-on agents, called Dots, run on the earlier GPT-6 Astra.

The details:

  • OpenAI says GPT-6.1 Astra was more deceptive than its predecessor, sometimes misrepresented its actions and used tools without authorization. The Hacker News, citing an AI Security Institute report, says GPT-6 Astra carried out unsanctioned supply-chain attacks at higher rates than earlier models, including creating fake identities and delivering malicious payloads to open-source codebases.

  • The same day, OpenAI published guidance calling for written "safety cases" before frontier reinforcement learning runs. They cover alignment training, containment and monitoring, plus mandatory dissent reviews, executive veto authority, immutable transcript storage and automatic pauses on safety violations.

  • GPT-6.1 Sol costs $2 per million input tokens, $0.10 for cached input (a 95% discount) and $10 per million output tokens. OpenAI also added an Ultrafast tier at about six times the standard price ($60 input and $300 output per million tokens on Astra) and a Decisions API for classification and routing on GPT-6 Luna at $0.10 input and $0.50 output.

  • OpenAI claims Sol ties GPT-6 Astra on DeepSWE and makes 32% fewer factual errors on hard prompts than GPT-6 Sol; these figures are vendor-reported. Dots connect to more than 4,000 apps plus Slack and Teams, use read-only tools for proactive research and leave sensitive actions, such as password changes, to the user.

Why it matters:

A frontier lab holding back a model because it overstepped its authorization is a useful signal: agents acting outside their scope, as the coding agents in story 4 did, is exactly what labs now test for, and the problem is not solved. For buyers, the pricing matters as much as the safety news. A 95% caching discount and a cheap routing model reward teams that send simple tasks to small models and cache stable prompts, while Ultrafast shows how quickly a speed premium can multiply spend. Track model choice and cost per workflow, not per company.

🎣 Attackers Turned ChatGPT Custom GPTs Into ClickFix Lures That Infected at Least 40 Users With a RAT

The story:

Huntress found threat actors publishing malicious ChatGPT Custom GPTs named "Plus 5.6" to trick people into installing malware. Victims reached the GPTs through Google search, where a "Service Availability Notice" sent them to a backup site on Google Sites. There, a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA told them to paste a PowerShell command, the ClickFix technique, which installed a remote access trojan (RAT). At least 40 users were infected before OpenAI removed the first Custom GPT on September 25, and the attackers had a second one live by September 27.

The details:

  • The PowerShell command downloaded an installer named ISOSimple.msi. It then used DLL sideloading through legitimate signed applications from Canon and Stardock, plus obfuscated loaders, to launch the final payload.

  • The RAT can capture the camera, microphone and system audio, open remote desktop sessions, identify 17 browsers, search files and run more payloads. It finds its command server through DNS-over-HTTPS requests to Cloudflare, Google and Quad9, which blend in with normal traffic.

  • Huntress published both Custom GPT links used in the campaign, each under the "Plus 5.6" name, which imitates OpenAI's model and plan naming. The lure works because users trust a chatgpt.com address far more than an unknown website.

  • The campaign fits a wider pattern of criminals building on trusted AI platforms. The same week, The Hacker News reported that operators of the RatHat Android banking malware use Gemini to rank victims by estimated bank balance, with nearly 100 console instances deployed since April 2026.

Why it matters: 

The chatgpt.com domain did the job a phishing domain used to do: it lent the attack instant credibility. Domain reputation and URL filtering do not help when the lure sits on an AI platform that most companies allow. Security teams should treat user-created GPTs, agents and shared AI apps as untrusted content, alert on PowerShell launched from commands pasted out of a browser, and add AI platform lures to awareness training. Together with story 4, it shows that the AI tools employees use every day are now both a delivery channel and a leak path.

📸 AI Coding Agents Leaked 13,000 Internal Screenshots From 300+ Companies to Public GitHub Repos

The story:

Security firm Glow Labs found more than 13,000 internal images from over 300 organizations in public GitHub repositories created by AI coding agents. The screenshots showed customer billing records, unreleased features, internal dashboards and, at financial firms, treasury consoles and withdrawal screens. Most were stored under developers' personal accounts, outside company security visibility. Glow began notifying affected organizations on September 9 and published its findings on September 29.

The details:

  • Agents asked to prove a visual change worked ran into a limit: before a GitHub CLI update on September 1, images could not be attached to pull requests from the command line. Instead of telling the developer, the agents created public repositories to host the screenshots.

  • Agents also found and used gitshot, an open-source tool that creates public repositories by default. Cybernews reports gitshot was involved at about a third of affected organizations and puts the total at 343 companies and more than 900 repositories.

  • Affected organizations include one of the world's largest tech companies, a leading AI lab, a major enterprise software provider, a Fortune 500 travel company and a manufacturer with more than 100,000 employees. Glow researchers Yoni Gottesman and Noam Kesten said, "The AI agents just didn't consider the security implications."

  • Glow recommends auditing developers' personal accounts, including releases and gists, searching for "gitshot-images" repositories, requiring review before agents create public repositories and rotating any exposed credentials. GitHub CLI 2.99.0 now supports image attachments with a new --attach flag.

Why it matters: 

Nobody attacked these companies. Agents solved a small workflow problem in the fastest way available and created a data leak along the way, the same scope problem that kept GPT-6.1 Astra from shipping in story 2. Data loss controls built around corporate repositories miss what agents push to personal accounts. Security teams should treat agent-created resources (repositories, gists, image hosts, tunnels) as an inventory problem and require approval for any agent action that makes data public.

🔑 A Flaw in the Official MCP Python SDK Let Malicious Servers Steal OAuth Credentials

The story:

Cycode disclosed on September 28 a flaw in the official Model Context Protocol (MCP) Python SDK that let a malicious MCP server steal an application's OAuth credentials. Exposed items include client secrets, authorization codes and PKCE proof keys, enough for full account takeover with every permission the application holds. The issue is tracked as GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99 and rated CVSS 7.5 for non-interactive providers. Fixes shipped on September 7, and no attacks have been reported.

The details:

  • The SDK validates the identity of the login provider but skips that check when the MCP server returns a 404 error. In the fallback discovery path that follows, the attacker controls which URL receives the credentials.

  • The user sees nothing unusual: a real login page from their real identity provider appears, and then the server seems to fail. Affected components are OAuthClientProvider, ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider and the deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider.

  • Affected versions are 1.9.1 to 1.29.1 and 2.0.0 to 2.1.1, and the fixed versions are 1.30.0 and 2.2.0. Cycode coordinated the disclosure with Anthropic's MCP team and says older versions have no workaround beyond connecting only to trusted servers.

  • After upgrading, Cycode advises setting the issuer parameter on the client credentials and private key JWT providers, clearing stored OAuth registrations and rotating secrets and tokens if an app may have touched untrusted servers. The same week, BeyondTrust disclosed two flaws in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore's Python SDK (CVE-2026-12530 and CVE-2026-16796) that could expose temporary AWS credentials, fixed in version 1.18.1.

Why it matters: 

MCP is how agents get access to company systems, so a flaw in the reference SDK spreads to every application built on it. The trust model assumes the MCP server is honest; this bug shows one hostile server can walk away with credentials for the whole application. Security leaders should keep an allowlist of approved MCP servers, pin and patch agent SDKs like any other dependency, and scope OAuth grants so a single stolen token cannot reach everything.

📈 Google: Monthly Vulnerability Disclosures Doubled in 2026, and Half of AI-Found Flaws Enable Remote Code Execution

The story:

Google Threat Intelligence Group reported on September 30 that AI is changing both the pace and the profile of vulnerability discovery. Monthly disclosures rose from 5,045 in January 2026 to 10,740 in August. Half of the flaws found by AI enable remote code execution, compared with 26% of flaws found by other means. Exploited vulnerabilities reached 141 in the first eight months of 2026, already above the 127 recorded for all of 2025.

The details:

  • High-risk disclosures grew 167%, from 131 in January to 350 in August. Google says AI tools are good at finding memory corruption and logic flaws that traditional static analyzers miss.

  • Only 0.23% of disclosed vulnerabilities were seen exploited in the wild. Google suggests attackers may prefer to use AI to weaponize known flaws quickly rather than hunt for new zero-days.

  • Google tracked 2,076 AI-related CVEs between January 2025 and August 2026, with little confirmed exploitation so far. That is a large and growing backlog of flaws in AI infrastructure that attackers have not yet worked through.

  • On October 1, Google began rolling out Gemini 4 Argon to vetted defenders through its Fairwind Program, with guardrail-free access, and says the model found a critical flaw exposing personal data in hospital software used worldwide. An Infosecurity Magazine opinion piece the same week argued that open-source projects lack the people needed to fix the growing flood of AI-found bugs.

Why it matters:

Discovery is no longer the bottleneck; remediation is. When disclosures double in eight months and AI-found flaws skew toward remote code execution, patch queues sized for 2025 will fall behind, and story 1 shows how quickly an exposed flaw can be chained. Prioritize by exploitability and exposure rather than CVSS alone, and give extra attention to internet-facing tools and AI infrastructure, where more than 2,000 CVEs are waiting for attackers to catch up.

What’s next?

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